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1
Abstract: This thesis examines the roles, ideologies, attitudes, and arguments of American
Catholics in debates over the Spanish Civil War from 1936-1939. Although the war only lasted
between these years, these debates carried over into WWII as Spain’s neutrality came into
question. Specifically, the focus is on how American Catholics grappled with historically
unprecedented Spanish anticlericalism, the direct murder of roughly 7000 Catholic clergy and
persecution of many more by Spanish Republicans, and why this anticlericalism drove most
Catholics into a form of unapologetic pro-Francoism. This research is conducted by careful
analysis of both mainstream and Catholic newspapers/journals. Mainstream pro-Republican
press is incredibly important as it provides an intensely stark contrast to Catholic arguments.
This analysis argues that America’s long and bitter history of anti-Catholicism gave substantial
and significant momentum to Catholic pro-Nationalist rhetoric and argumentation. Finally, the
conclusions reflect how anti-Catholicism drove Catholic discussions of Spain well into WWII.
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Figure 1- Republican Leftists ritually “execute” statue of Sacred Heart of Jesus outside of Madrid, August 7, 1936 (left) while
bodies of nuns or monks are disinterred and put out on public display in Barcelona, 1936 (right).

Introduction
The Spanish Civil War, fought from 1936-1939, in many ways foreshadowed the Second
World War as Spanish fascists and conservatives (the Nationalists) fought against Spanish
liberals, communists, socialists, and anarchists (the Republicans). The Nationalists received
international aid from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, while the Republicans received aid from
international liberals of various origins and the Soviet Union. Most are aware of this overarching
international ideological struggle, but fewer realize the fundamentally religious aspects of the
Spanish Civil War distorted by the bigger picture. The chief Catholic argument about the war
was that this was religious warfare while non-Catholics simply saw the war as a struggle against
fascism. In an article about the conflict from 1937, American Catholic writer Peter Arrupe
described this general ignorance succinctly: “The true meaning of this civil strife can be summed
up in one short phrase: the war is the outward expression of a profound crisis inside [Spain’s]
Catholic soul.” 1 After the military uprising in July 1936 following the assassination of the
prominent monarchist politician José Calvo Sotelo, Spanish leftists were consumed by

1

“Spanish War Psychology,” Commonweal, (January 29, 1937), 377-379.
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revolutionary fury and poured out their vengeance against what they perceived to be a
longstanding and monumental institutional barrier to their sociopolitical goals, the Catholic
Church.2
As José Sánchez argues in his monograph on civil war anticlericalism, “Religion became
the most clearly divisive issue of the war, the single aspect that distinguished one faction from
another.”3 As a result of the systematic and unprecedented liquidation of nearly 7000 Catholic
clergy over the course of the war by Republican leftists (with most being murdered within the
first six months of the start of the uprising), Spanish Catholics felt hard pressed not to throw their
weight behind Francisco Franco’s Nationalist cause whose political agenda not only promised to
protect the institutional Church from physical annihilation but also promised to restore the
Church to its position before the secular agenda of the Second Republic.4 However, by aligning
with the Nationalists, Spanish Catholics placed themselves in an almost impossible moral
dilemma when it became clear that Nationalist atrocities and post-war reprisals far exceeded
those of the Republicans, but in a manner different from the specific manifestations of
Republican anticlericalism.5 The Basque situation only further complicated these issues.6
If Catholicism, as the original Greek meaning suggests, represents a universal church
whose body of believers spread all throughout the world are all joined together through their

2

What better way to dispose of an institution such as the Church than to physically eliminate its priests and
churches? See Cueva, Julio de la. “Religious Persecution, Anticlerical Tradition and Revolution: On Atrocities
against the Clergy during the Spanish Civil War.” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 3 (1998) 355–369
3
Sánchez, José M. The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1987, pp. xviii.
4
Payne, Stanley G. The Spanish Civil War. Cambridge [England] : Cambridge University Press, 2012, 111-118.
5
Thomas, Maria. “Martyrs, Memory and Misrepresentation: The Spanish Catholic Church, Religious Persecution
and the Spanish Civil War.” International Journal of Iberian Studies 31, no. 3 (2018): 143–162.
6
Essentially, while the Basques had perhaps the strongest religiosity out of any geographical region in Spain, they
were adamantly committed to the Republic. This seeming contradiction puzzled not only Catholics around the world
but simultaneously created issues for Catholic pro-Nationalist arguments when Franco enabled atrocities and
reprisals against the Basque people, including some Basque clergy. For more about the Basques, see Sánchez, Ch. 6.
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common faith in Jesus Christ, what then were the reactions of foreign Catholics to Spain? The
British and French offered the more nuanced views of the war and saw the war through the lens
of republican/democratic traditions that sought to balance the precarious moral positions of
Spanish Catholics against the authoritarian excesses of the Nationalist regime.7 The reaction of
American Catholics to Republican excesses, however, was almost exclusively visceral and
reactionary. Catholic press almost universally held this sentiment in their editorializing on the
overseas conflict, with Catholic Worker being an obvious exception to this rule with their neutral
position.
The visceral reaction of American Catholics was in large part a reaction to the hostility
and stubbornness of anti-Catholic Protestants and secular intellectuals who viewed Catholics
with distrust as a consequence of xenophobia and hundreds of years of Protestant propaganda
and agitation. This propaganda consistently exaggerated the institutional influence of Rome and
its implications for American democracy/religious freedom. George Shuster, a prominent
Catholic and editor of Commonweal, referred to this phenomenon of reaction as “minorityitis” –
an automatic, emotional lashing out of Catholics against a hostile anti-Catholic majority.8
Essentially, the argument follows that Catholics assumed that these political or civil
disagreements were rooted in anti-Catholic prejudice.9 On the other hand, American Catholics

7

Sánchez rightly identifies the Spanish Civil War as provoking one of the most heated religious debates across the
wider Christian world, with the French having the most nuanced views based on the country’s history of
anticlericalism and Republicanism, See Sánchez, Ibid., 157-183.
8
As it will be explored later, Shuster actually managed to be quite introspective into the feelings of Catholics even
as an editor himself, Sánchez, Ibid., 185.
9
Shuster stated in another of his writings on the position of Catholicism of American society that minority status
was a real fear that dominated American Catholic thought in the 19th and early 20th centuries: “Twenty or thirty
years ago ambition would have dictated silence about one’s mere connection with what is termed the Roman
Church. Today prudence still seems to suggest keeping the matter under cover as fully as possible.” The Catholic
Spirit in America. New York: The Dial Press, 1927, vii.
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often exacerbated tensions by consistently agitating at the behest of the Vatican for issues like
the Roman Question which inevitably tied them precariously to Mussolini and Fascism.10

Figure 2- An example of the sort of propaganda used to agitate against the growing political influence of Catholic immigrants, in
this case regarding supposed papist infiltration of the public school system, Nast, Thomas, “The American River Ganges.” Wood
Engraving. Harper’s Weekly, September 30, 1871, 916.

Mutual suspicion of each other’s motives is a constant theme that plays out in this period
and in these debates. Even after the rhetoric of the Ku Klux Klan and other nativist organizations
had been largely relegated to the sidelines of mainstream political thought by the 30s in light of
the ongoing depression, there was still a persistent distrust of Catholicism and its adherents in the

10

In summary, the Roman Question concerned the position of the Vatican under a new liberal Italian regime which
did not recognize the traditional sovereignty and autonomy of the Holy See. This was a situation that satisfied most
liberals, who either simply did not care or wanted the church in a lower position while it outraged Catholics across
the world on the other hand. For an entire monograph on the subject of American Catholics, the Roman Question,
and Mussolini see D’Agostino, Peter R. Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento
to Fascism Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
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secular/Protestant aligned American press.11 This thesis will seek to examine the specific ways in
which American Catholics engaged in debates over the Spanish civil war through a discourse of
unapologetic Catholicism in the face of hostile and uniquely American anti-Catholicism. Finally,
this thesis will argue that it was the specific position of American Catholics as a minority with
newfound political efficacy in an intellectually hostile environment that provoked their mostly
unapologetic defense of the Nationalist cause in opposition to Republican anticlericalism.12
Sources: Across an Ideological Spectrum
The work of this thesis will be primarily based on the qualitative analysis of articles from
both the mainstream Catholic press and more mainstream secular liberal newspapers such as the
New York Times and the Washington Post. The mainstream press was as important as the
Catholic press for this issue as these papers often served as a rhetorical forum in which Catholics
could present their arguments, defenses, and ideas to the rest of the country. A perfect example
of mainstream press serving as a rhetorical forum presents itself in a letter to the editor defending
the historical role of the Church in Spain in light of the then recent publication of the 1937
Spanish Bishops’ Letter. The author of the letter was simply titled “a practicing Catholic.”13 I
will also be looking at the Jesuit run America, the lay Catholic Commonweal, the Paulist
Catholic World, and The Catholic Worker, which had recently been founded in 1933 by the labor
activist and former communist Dorothy Day.

11

An example of unrefined pro-Republicanism/Anti-Catholicism reveals itself as a reiteration of an old trope that
implicated the clergy as the initial conspirators and actual combatants in the initial phase of the Civil War. See
Montero Moreno, Antonio,. Historia de La Persecución Religiosa En España, 1936-1939. Madrid: Biblioteca de
Autores Cristianos, 1961, 65-69 for a description of this trope in its original Spanish Republican context and
Sánchez, Ibid., 192 for a description of a specifically American manifestation.
12
For an example of viewing the American Catholic issue in a specific local context, see Crosby, Donald F.
“Boston’s Catholics and the Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939.” The New England Quarterly 44, no. 1 (1971): 82–100
13
“A Spanish War Symposium,” The Washington Post, (October 29, 1937), 8.
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America, founded in 1909 and headquartered in midtown Manhattan, was and continues
to be a weekly journal dedicated to discussing Catholic issues and culture. In line with the
intellectual mission of the Jesuit order, it was a means for the organization, along with other
writers, to engage with American politics and cultural life. Although it is now considered one of
the more liberal American Catholic publications based on the now liberal position of the Jesuit
order within the Church, it was not so liberal under the direction of Francis X. Talbot S J., editor
in chief of the magazine from 1936 to 1944. In a dissertation on Talbot’s support for the
Nationalists and Franco, Michael McGowan writes:
Indeed, the Nationalist insurgents had no better friend in the United States than Father
Talbot, whose editorials, speeches, coordination of the American hierarchy, and relief
work constituted a bulwark of support for Franco’s government that was unrivaled among
other American pro-Nationalist groups.14
Thus, under Talbot, America was decidedly pro-Nationalist and pro-Franco in its writings on the
subject of the war and anticlericalism.
Commonweal, founded in 1924 by Michael Williams as a weekly issue journal, was and
is the oldest independent lay-edited Catholic journal. Another New York City publication,
Commonweal sought to establish itself as another ‘liberal’ intellectual Catholic journal that could
compete with other contemporary American liberal publications such as The New Republic.
Williams conceived of the magazine as a means for Catholic intellectual thought to “be conveyed
to the minds of the American people.”15 However, the ‘liberal’ connotation in this instance does
not refer to the same type of ‘liberal’ ideas that the modern magazines (both America and
Commonweal) now present sometimes in contradiction to official Church teaching on issues such
as clerical celibacy, divorce, and homosexuality.

14

McGowan, Michael K. 2002. "Franco's Priest: Father Francis X. Talbot and the Spanish Civil War." Order No.
1411397, American University.
15
"A Brief History Of Commonweal". 2022.Commonwealmagazine.org.
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Catholic World, a monthly issued periodical founded in 1865 by Paulist Father Issac
Thomas Hecker, is the oldest media outlet covered in this research. Regarding his inspiration for
establishing the magazine, Paulist Press (publisher for all Paulist related works) states that
because Hecker could not contact everyone in public lectures about American Catholicism, he
turned to the printed word, wanting “to create an intellectual journal for a growing Catholic
population, and insisted that it be a first-class publication in format, quality, and style, equal if
not superior to any secular magazine in the country.”16 Similar to the ambitions of America and
Commonweal, Catholic World wanted to compete in the American intellectual landscape with
the existing secular and Protestant publications. However, what separates the Paulist order from
the more widely known Jesuit order is that the Paulists were a missionary society made by and
for Americans. Consequently, it follows that they would use the tools of modern communication
to advance their Catholic message to the rest of America. Unlike the other three Catholic sources
that continue publishing, Catholic World ceased publication in 1996.17
These Catholic newspapers provide the best source of information on this subject because
were widely disseminated throughout the country and, through heavy editorialization, showed
the real sentiments of the writers on these subjects. With little exception, every writing on the
Spanish war from these publications were in an editorial manner rather than simply relaying
information as a more mainstream publication might do, such as the New York Times. This
editorialization presents benefits to this analysis since authors arrive straight to their point
without hiding their motivations in subtleties and understatements, something that mainstream
publications were often accused of doing in what would have been called pro-Republican
propaganda by Catholic press.

16
17

"About: Paulist Press— Our History". 2022. Paulistpress.com.
Ibid.
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Although it can be argued that the feelings of a select group of Catholic writers and
editors do not represent the feelings of the rest of the Catholic body politic, these articles in many
ways were simply a rehearsal of the same
messages being delivered at the pulpit in every
church throughout the country.18 Trying to
determine whether the media/clergy created this
sort of opinion and spreading it or if Catholics
would have already held these views is not
something this thesis seeks to determine.
Discussions of media influence in this context
seems too much like a chicken or egg problem.19
Looking at this press is therefore important as the
Figure 3- The Ven. Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen, renowned
author, theologian, and Catholic celebrity, then only a
Monsignor, was an immensely influential Catholic figure in
radio during the 30s well before his tv career in the 50s.

messages provide clear indicators of the Catholic

position in this time period. The role of Catholic media was not only to disseminate news on the
anticlerical violence in Spain, but also to explicitly reinforce the existential, spiritual nature of
the conflict.
Simultaneously, we can interpret the role of Catholic newspapers and editorials as being
American Catholicism’s main contribution to the national public forum. In the era where the
newspaper was king, the image of the contrarian Catholic press provided a concrete, easily
recognizable example of the political and cultural stance of Catholics throughout the country, so

18

Even the Times often found it convenient to simply quote from the pulpit to get the Catholic side of the story,
“Sees French Revolution: Mgr. Sheen Says Priests and Nuns Prepare to Flee Communists,” The New York Times,
(August 24, 1937), 19.
19
This references the age-old question as to if media productions represent a genuine cultural outflowing of the
populace or if media merely manufactures opinions to disseminate to the public at the behest of various, disparate
elite groups.
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that their protesting voices were known to the rest of WASP (White Anglo Saxon Protestant) and
liberal America. Even if Catholic publications were usually only disseminated to Catholics, other
publications like the Times could disseminate their viewpoints by proxy when reporting on large
gatherings or notable events; especially when the rhetoric naturally provided for a catchy
headline.20 The role of mainstream papers like the Times will become even more apparent when
we reach the topic of the 1937 Spanish Bishops’ Letter. There, liberals challenged Catholics
directly for their position on the Civil War for the first time in an intellectually meaningful way.
There are two main poles of thought regarding the Spanish Civil War, between which
Catholics fell on an ideological spectrum. The majority position of Catholic writers and
intellectuals was a form of unapologetic proFrancoism that praised Franco as a savior of
Catholicism and Western Civilization
against an existential threat posed by
atheistic Communism. Not surprisingly, this
position was markedly anti-communist and
best reflects the sort of “minorityitis” that
Shuster referred to in his writings since these
opinions fall on the direct opposite side of
the thought spectrum from the rest of
mainstream WASP America. Where Catholics
saw the military rebellion as the necessary and

20

Figure 4- Father Charles Coughlin was another prominent
Catholic clerical celebrity who did not hesitate to “Jew bait” or
“red bait” in his declarations on the Spanish question over the air
or in his paper Social Justice until he was raided by the FBI and
forced to cease public discourse in 1942 because of continued
isolationist extremism following Pearl Harbor.

For example, the Times quoted a priest declaring Spanish rebels dying for the cause as saints, something likely
provocative enough that it would easily raise eyebrows in a mainstream audience, “Martyrdom Seen in Spanish
Strife: Father Kellenberg Says Rebels Dying for Catholic Faith Have Earned Sainthood,” Ibid., (November 2, 1936),
16.
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natural consequence of years of Communist infiltration, agitation, and then outright revolution,
liberals and Protestants saw the rebellion as a coup against a legitimate democracy. The Jesuit
America and the Paulist Catholic World gravitated closest to the former Francoist pole rather
than the latter Republican pole.
The other focus of Catholic thought on the subject was unmistakably more neutral on the
subject and toed a cautious line as to not support Franco’s cause but also to not implicitly
endorse the anticlericalism from the left. The lay edited and run Commonweal, along with
Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker, gravitated closer to this neutralist, pacifist pole. In fact, George
Shuster, once an editor of Commonweal, would remain one of the most neutral and introspective
voices until the end of the war. The Washington Post broadcasted Commonweal’s new official
neutralist position in a 1938 article titled “A Catholic View: ‘Commonweal’ Editors Urge
‘Positive Impartiality’ Among Americans Viewing Spanish War; Partisanship Deprecated.”21
This less reactionary pole was almost entirely drowned out within Catholic circles by a cry for
crusade and holy vengeance. Nonetheless, as David Valaik argues in his article on American
Catholic dissenters, is the significance of neutral pacifist publications like Catholic Worker
giving “[…] serious attention to the implications of Franco’s alliance with the fascist powers,”
especially if no one else in the Catholic community was doing it.22
Anti-Catholicism in America: Background and Recent Memory
The recent history of the United States in the years leading up to the 1930s left much
room for improvement for mainstream American relations with Roman Catholicism and its
adherents. The reality was that an overwhelming majority of the original Americans inherited a

This declaration of neutrality followed Commonweal’s leadership crisis in 1937 that had pushed the magazine
towards the pro-Franco pole, June 23, 1938.
22
Valaik, David J. “American Catholic Dissenters and the Spanish Civil War.” The Catholic Historical Review 53,
no. 4 (1968): 543.
21
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long Protestant Anti-Catholic tradition as a consequence of the European wars of religion of the
16th and 17th centuries. Although American Protestants had always been suspicious of Catholics
since the dawn of the Thirteen Colonies amidst the international conflict between France, Spain,
and Britain, Catholics themselves would
remain, to the public eye, a relatively
insignificant minority until the mid-19th
century and the surge of Irish immigration
as a consequence of the Great Potato
Blight. With this new wave of Catholic
immigration, Americans reacted violently
first with the Nativist movement and the
Know-Nothing Party and then later with
paramilitary organizations like the Ku
Figure 5-Another example of Nativist propaganda highlighting
exaggerated fears of papal control of the United States through
Catholic immigration, Nast, Thomas, “The Promised Land.” Wood
Engraving. Harper’s Weekly, October 1, 1870, 626.

Klux Klan.23 In fact, one of the main
motivations in the 1880s to form the

Knights of Columbus (KoC), the largest Catholic men’s fraternal organization in America to this
day, was to provide a direct counterweight to the racist Nativist rhetoric of the Klan.24 The
presence and active work of the KoC was key in developing a defensive infrastructure in
America for Catholics and immigrants.
Even into the 20th century, the legacy of Protestant fears of papal domination continued to
fuel a lingering suspicion, surviving as far as the presidential campaign of America’s first

23

The chief understanding of course being that groups like the Klan were merely the logical conclusion of Nativist
rhetoric and agitations.
24
A recent article from the Knights of Columbus succinctly summarizes the vital role the KoC played in the fight
against the Klan, Coyne, Kevin, “The Knights vs. the Klan.” Knights of Columbus, (November 11, 2017).
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Catholic president, John F. Kennedy.25 Despite this hostility, Irish Americans quickly adapted to
the situation at hand and quickly integrated themselves into the American body politic. This is
best realized perhaps in the huge participation of Irish immigrants in the Union army during the
Civil War. After the Irish, Italians who immigrated over the ocean at the end of the 19th century
became the second largest bloc of Catholic immigrants. With both the Irish and Italian ethnic
blocs united by both religion and political association with their urban, immigrant status,
Catholicism had not only survived Nativist attempts to squash it, but it now found itself on a
potentially formidable political base.
After the end of the First World War, conservative/isolationist backlash to the
Progressive Era and the experience of the first world war led to a 1924 immigration reform
statute based on the now infamous national origins quota system.26 While the statute seriously
curtailed immigration across the board, it particularly affected immigration from Southern and
Eastern European countries like Italy and Poland, which provided a huge percentage of the
American Catholic population. Hennesey notes that pressure for this new immigration legislation
was not without religious overtones; with an implicit understanding that “‘moderates throughout
the nation were no less disturbed than Klansmen about the threat that America would go Catholic
by immigration.’”27 Already emboldened by the non-action of Wilson and the aloofness of the
Harding then Coolidge administrations, racist Nativist groups like the Ku Klux Klan once again
found themselves on the soapbox of anti-Catholicism and had a field day with their hostile
rhetoric throughout the country.
Roos, Dave, “How John F. Kennedy Overcame Anti-Catholic Bias to Win the Presidency.” History.com. A&E
Television Networks, (November 20, 2019).
26
I would be remiss not to also mention the potential role of anti-Catholicism in Progressive Era reform movements
such as the Temperance movement with regards to working class ethnic blocs like the Irish or Italians, see Hennesy,
James J. American Catholics A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States Oxford University
Press [New York], 1981, 231-232.
27
Ibid., 237.
25
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While much of their frustration was directly poured onto Blacks in the form of lynching,
arson, intimidation, and other forms of targeted mob violence, Klansmen did not hesitate to use
both rhetoric and violence against Catholics and immigrants.28 The two failed presidential bids of
Alfred E. Smith perhaps best demonstrated the anti-Catholic sentiment of Americans. With his
Catholicism, “…Tammany background, ‘wet’ proclivities, or views on finance,” anti-Catholics
had no issues in venting their prejudices through mainstream media and at the ballot box.29 In
addition to the domestic issues facing Catholics, the handling of the Mexican situation and the
ensuing anticlericalism, in many ways a prelude to anticlericalism in Spain, engendered
disillusionment and left many Catholics embittered and resentful of establishment WASP figures
like Woodrow Wilson.30
By the end of the 1920s, American Catholics now had every reason to be frustrated with
their lot in both American politics and the larger cultural sphere. Perhaps the 19th century had
been different since they were fewer Catholics. By the 30s however, with so many more
Catholics as a result of mass immigration, minority, second-class citizen status was not an
acceptable position anymore. Frustrated for decades by Nativists, Protestants, Progressives,
Masons, and Klansmen, American Catholics now had every reason to set themselves apart from
the rest of the body politic. Reaction to news of anticlerical atrocities in the Spanish Civil War
demonstrates Catholic opinion in the most spectacular fashion. In a way, Catholic outrage and an

28

The Knights of Columbus article briefly summarizes some of the more violent episodes of anti-Catholic Klan
violence which included both outright murder and arson, Coyne, Ibid.
29
Hennesy, 246-247
30
The Catholic argument followed that the diplomatic actions and/or inactions of the Wilson administration enabled
anticlericalism in Mexico. In an article defending his position with regards to the Church in Spain, George Shuster
wrote about Mexico: “[T]here is no possible excuse for the callousness with which American journalism and
American opinion treated the spoliation of the Church by gentry whose very manifestos belied all democratic or
moral intent.” He would go on to cite American indifference towards the plight of the religious in post-Tsar Russia
as another keystone of Catholic embitterment, “A Catholic Defends His Church,” The New Republic, (January 4,
1939), 246-248.
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enthusiastic embrace of Franco’s cause perfectly encapsulates the “minorityitis” Shuster referred
to.
It was not difficult for Catholics to be contrarian when some Protestants/liberals harbored
such a blatant denialism for any role played by the Spanish Republic in instigating or enabling
the anticlerical bloodshed. For example, the Times quoted Rev. Dr. John A. MacKay, then
president of Princeton Theological Seminary, who placed the blame on the Spanish Archbishop
of Toledo by suggesting that “‘there was nothing fratricidal, no spirit of class, no anti-religious
feeling, no anti-clerical feeling when the Spanish people voted for democracy’” until “‘[…] a
constitutional limitation was put on democracy by certain ecclesiastical authorities.’”31 With
enough of these sort of opinions published in the press as to be mainstream, contrarianism was
likely an easy rhythm to fall into. The initial reactions to anticlerical violence demonstrated this
phenomenon quite well.
The Outbreak of Religious War: Initial Reactions & Scapegoats
The period from June 1936 to the middle of 1937 is the most important time period for
understanding anything regarding Spanish anticlericalism as it was the bloodiest period for
anticlericalism throughout Republican controlled regions. Consequently, the volume of news
regarding anticlerical atrocities would have been at its highest volume in this period. This section
seeks to analyze initial Catholic reactions to these atrocities through their writings as their
reactions set the tone for their positions regarding Spain, Franco, and contrasts to the republican
stances of American liberals and Protestants.
The initial news of anticlerical atrocities to reach the United States following the civicmilitary uprising was, unsurprisingly, not well received by American Catholics. Such horrific

“Hate of Clergy Laid to Spanish Hierarch: Head of Princeton Seminary Says Toledo Primate Roused People by
Opposing Republic,” The New York Times, (March 6, 1937), 6.
31
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crimes against God’s Church naturally needed an explanation. Due primarily to a lack of good
verifiable information, stories of extreme martyrdom, containing mixed up facts or outright
misinformation, provided further fuel to an already roaring fire, further incensing both Spanish
Catholics fighting for the Nationalists and American Catholics watching from the sidelines. The
most extreme example of martyrdom was a commonly (and inaccurately) reported story of
crucifixions of Catholics by leftist militia. However, this was a story that even the cleric writer
Montero Moreno, who wrote the chief Spanish monograph on the subject of anticlerical violence
in the 60s, could not substantiate. 32 Regardless, many Catholics took this news as sacrosanct
proof of the barbarity of the Loyalists and their atheistic thugs. All of this, however, is not to
suggest that the same issue did not also plague reporting from the pro-Republican side, only that
in the Catholic case, misinformation seemed to have directly entrenched preconceptions about
the spiritual and existential nature of the conflict. Both sides seemed to be plagued by
misinformation, bad sources, and outright propaganda. Or more likely, it was some perverse mix
of all three. Initial outrage at the facts themselves seems to only have been softened by a desire
to explain why these atrocities were happening or more simply, who was responsible. The lowhanging fruit or obvious scapegoat for the ongoing catastrophe in Spain was communism broadly
or specifically the Soviet Union.
The chief concern of many Catholic observers was the role of Soviet agitation and
provocation in the ongoing conflict in Spain, with an ultimate fear that Republican victory would
be akin to total Sovietization of Spain and the destruction of religion and the Church as a
whole.33 As the anticlerical violence spilled over the country, Catholics’ fears and suspicions

See “Anarchy in Spain,” America, Vol. 55 Issue 24, (September 19, 1936), 564, for the sort of article that heavily
promoted this misinformed story.
33
“Perils of a Communist Victory in Spain,” Ibid., Vol. 55 Issue 18, (August. 8, 1936), 421.
32
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were largely confirmed. The end result was that most articles carefully scrutinized the leading
role of communists in the instigation of the civil war, arguing mainly that what was happening
was the result of a “carefully prepared and prolonged attack, spreading over many years […]”34
By analyzing the subversive activity of both unofficial and official Soviet agitators in the years
leading up to the war, Catholic World concluded that, through the corruption and exploitation of
worker/agrarian sentiments, the Soviets had effectively implemented a “Trojan Horse policy”
from which they would “detach, gently and persuasively, Catholics of all countries from their
loyal allegiance to the Vicar of Christ, to their bishops, and to their priests.”35 While the concern
for the situation in Spain itself was grave, there was also the fear that the violence would
continue to spread throughout the world. Moreover, the same thing could potentially happen in
America. Citing the Holy Father’s warnings against the evils of atheistic communism, America
argued that American ignorance of these worldwide realities could spell similar Communistic
disaster at home:
[M]any Americans […] believe that the people of Spain, of Mexico, and of Russia, are
fighting to establish governments for the protection of all human rights. This error is
grave, especially since it creates among our people a disposition to welcome similar
movements into this country, or to look upon them as nothing more alarming than a
minor political revolt.36
While America and Catholic World were quick to take up the banner of anticommunism
and the Nationalists, Commonweal first offered a more nuanced line of argument before editor
Michael William’s liaison with pro-Francoism in mid-1937.37 Regarding Spanish Fascism
directly, the journal remarked:
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Spanish Fascism will be the antithesis to the radical social demands made by the
revolutionists […] it will not liberate creative Catholic social energies, which have
struggled to emerge during hundreds of years […] A right social order cannot be
promulgated from on top […] We cannot see any reason for stridently applauding the
present rebels. The lessons of history are too plain for that.38
Commonweal, under the editorial direction of neutral figures like George Shuster, definitively
toed a more neutralist line regarding Spain and continued to observe the impact that the Spanish
conflict was having on American society. They noted in the beginning that any reporting of the
actual conflict was made almost irrelevant because of the uncertain nature of facts and the
intrusive + persuasive nature of propaganda. What was more important was how to take the
lessons of the civil war and to apply it to the betterment of the “social order” while avoiding any
totalitarian tendencies and instead moving towards a “personalist, Christian state.” 39
More nuance in its approach towards the Republican faction also appears briefly in the
latter half of an America article written by Harry Chapin Plummer, in which he showed
sympathy for those “hundreds of thousands of men and youths who have been impressed into
service in the ‘Anti-Fascist Militia.”40 While the violence against the Church and common
decency were still inexcusable, there is definitely a sense here that hundreds of thousands of
people were being roped into a movement that they would otherwise never have participated in.
Similarly, there is a slight hint from a Washington Post article that the consensus of American
Catholic intellectuals was not thoroughly transmitted or disseminated to the rest of the Catholic
populace. Dr. Joseph Code, a faculty member of the Catholic University of America, stated to an
audience that
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It is disturbing, to say the least, to see so little active interest among American Catholics
in what is going on in Spain. It is even more disturbing to find them so little informed,
[…] and it is positively shocking to see some of them allowing their apathy and
ignorance to carry them into absurdities of speech when the subject is being discussed.41
What does this have to say about the real nature of the rhetorical battle? Was it a field dominated
by intellectuals or did the common people also have a stake in it? From only this one article it is
difficult to suggest that the general mass of American Catholics were completely uninterested in
the issue, only that maybe there was simply not the sort of enthusiasm that intellectuals like Code
were hoping for. The body of evidence discussed so far suggests that American Catholics deeply
cared about these issues enough to prompt responses from the rest of the country.
On the other side of the aisle, and much to the dismay of Catholics, the secular/liberal
intelligentsia had already bound themselves to the side of the Republicans with the divisions of
Loyalists and Rebels (Nationalist) given to the opposing factions in the conflict. Both liberals
and Protestants almost argued universally that the sole blame for the conflict lay with the Right
for their feet dragging on critical social reforms and their reactionary policies that spawned the
military revolt. As the denotation of “rebel” suggests, liberals clearly saw the revolt as an
illegitimate attempt to destroy Spanish democracy. Despite the difficulty of fighting against this
sort of rhetoric, Catholics either completely ignored the pejorative connotation of “rebel” or
utilized the term in a clever way like one Catholic preacher who likened the Nationalists to
American patriots during the Revolutionary War with Franco as their George Washington.42
Some Catholics simply implored the mainstream press to treat the Spanish issue more honestly
rather than falling for loyalist propaganda and being mouthpieces for communists, as editor
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Michael Williams did so in a long winded article for Commonweal.43 Similarly, another long
editorial and meditation from Catholic World questioned the motives of American liberals in
ignoring the moral faults of the Loyalists while condemning the Nationalists for atrocities and
the bombing of Guernica.44
An interesting voice that stands out from the rest of the crowd among the mainstream
Catholic press comes in the form of a Commonweal article written by E. Harold Smith. Smith
scrutinized the role of conservative/reactionary Catholics in standing against necessary social
reform and argued that this behavior was ultimately self-defeating and contrary to the explicit
goals of the Church in spreading the Gospel. Smith compared the Church’s role with regards to
the labor question issue in the United States to countries like Spain in which he argued that the
Church lost its legitimacy in the eyes of workers. He warned that, without a serious re-evaluation
of the origins of anticlerical violence in episodes like the French Revolution or the Spanish Civil
War, the Church would continue to lose the working class to the agitations of Communists.
Smith concluded that
[…] we must act speedily, The Holy Father warned us in 1931 of a revolution that was
brewing. Spain did not heed the warning. Shall we never learn from the history of the
Church in other countries? It is not the Church or the Church’s teaching in any country
that has failed the workingman. It is we Catholics here and elsewhere who have failed the
Church45.
This concern of losing the working class most noticeably appears again with Catholic Worker.
The Spanish Bishops’ Letter: The New York Times and Rhetorical Warfare
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In the course of American press coverage of the Spanish Civil War, no single event
polarized Americans along political and religious lines as completely as the publication of the
Spanish Bishops’ Collective Letter in the September 3rd, 1937, edition of the New York Times.
This letter was a joint declaration of Spain’s Catholic hierarchy in support of Franco’s uprising
and a plea to the rest of the world, not just Catholics, to support the Nationalist cause in light of
an existential communist threat posed by the Republicans. While the mostly partisan Catholic
press had been fully committed to the Nationalist cause since the outbreak of the war and their
articles had been circulating among Catholic readers well before the publication of this Letter,
the American Catholic viewpoint had not so publicly manifested itself to the rest of America
until liberal/Protestant criticism of the Letter called for defensive maneuvers.
The Letter itself is particularly useful in understanding American opinions of the war as it
appeared at the midpoint of the war when American coalitions had demonstrably crystalized
around the two Spanish factions and political pressure began to directly build on Congress and
the Roosevelt administration.46 Additionally, because of its publication in such a mainstream
platform as the New York Times, American Catholics now had the unique opportunity to make
their case to the rest of America just as the Spanish Bishops did to the rest of the world.
Reactions to the Letter provide valuable insight into not only the general juxtaposition of the proNationalist Catholic position and the pro-Republican liberal/Protestant position but also an
encapsulation of the debate over the war at large.
What exactly from the letter was so polarizing as to provoke such a negative reaction
from American liberals/Protestants? Like the initial reactions of American Catholics, the bishops
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underscored the role of Soviet communists in clandestine operations before the outbreak of the
war. Explaining the impetus for the military uprising, the bishops stated
[…] Spain had no other alternative but this; either to perish in the definite assault of
destructive communism, already prepared and decreed, […] or to attempt a titanic effort
of resistance, in order to escape from the terrible enemy and to save the fundamental
principles of her social life and of her national characteristics.47
This justification stood in complete contrast to what most Americans believed about the nature of
the conflict and thus likely provoked their response. The title from the Times itself demonstrates
the crux of the issue for the average American: “Justifying Franco Rebellion (emphasis mine).”48
How could anyone support a fascist coup against a legitimate, democratic government? It is not
surprising to see how this sort of viewpoint could be easily entrenched when Catholics were
blocking out any alternative viewpoints, along with being caught up in a venomous mix of
propaganda, agitation, prejudice, and misinformation. The bishops also explicitly denied any
subservience or dependence to the Franco movement. What is also worthy of note for the
purposes of this thesis is the publication in The Washington Post of the American episcopal
hierarchy’s (American Bishops)’ glowing response to the Spanish Bishops’ Letter, which
rubberstamped the position of American Catholics from the top.49
The rhetorical battle in the NYT dramatically escalated in only a month, culminating in
mutual accusations of fascist or communist sympathies. Four days after the publication of the
Letter in the Times, historian and contributor to U.S. diplomatic affairs James T. Shotwell’s
editorial made a scathing critique of the bishops’ arguments, questioning the legitimacy of the
use of arms “to secure political aims,” a perceived silence on Nationalist atrocities, and the
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sincerity of the bishops in characterizing the conflict as a “national plebiscite”.50 Shotwell’s letter
and rhetoric effectively represented the position of most pro-Loyalist Americans with respect to
both the Nationalist side and, as it naturally follows, the Catholic Church’s role in the war. The
rhetoric accused the bishops of harboring Fascist/Nazi authoritarian tendencies and,
consequently, placed pro-Nationalist Catholics at large under suspicion. Naturally, an accusation
of being an American fascist/Nazi sympathizer during that time period demanded correction.51
Four days later, in the September 11th edition, Jesuit editor of the Catholic journal
America John La Farge rebutted, offering an alternative view that simultaneously denied any
associations with Fascists/Nazis and depicted the pre-civil war Spanish republic as being in
complete disorder; coopted by anarchist elements, unable to maintain law and order, and only
moments away from a Soviet-backed communist.52 The specter of communism as a threat not
only to the Spanish nation but to Western/Christian civilization as a whole is a common theme
that was integral to many of these arguments.53 Rather than clarifying the association with
Fascists and Nazis, La Farge denied any association or sympathies and pointed at the role of the
Soviet Union in creating/enabling the conflict, thus justifying the intervention of other powers.
Specifically, he argued, “If a man may defend himself with his own gun, why may he not call in
his neighbor to aid with the neighbor’s gun?”54 Rather than a revolt against a legitimate
authority, La Farge argued that the military uprising was merely a defense against an already
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belligerent, existential communist threat. Thus, La Farge’s rebuttal presented the standard view
of the pro-Nationalist Catholic to the American public.
However, rather than let the issue of the Letter rest with this brief exchange, the proLoyalists took the offensive up again in the form of a letter signed by 150 Protestant intellectuals
and clergymen again condemning the arguments of the bishops’ letter and further entrenching
opposing positions. The authors of this new letter attacked the Church as an agent directly
opposed to republican democracy and interestingly, claimed that the Popular Front government
had nothing to do with anticlerical violence while simultaneously characterizing Nationalist
atrocities as directed from above in a mechanical manner. Thus, their rhetoric played into a
cliché of attributing Republican violence to “uncontrollables” and the mob while attributing
Nationalist violence to commands “from above.”55 What this cliché shows is that
Protestant/liberal intellectuals were unwilling to associate the Republican government with any
anticlerical violence and pro-Franco Catholics were willing to overlook authoritarian/fascist
tendencies in the cause they supported either directly or merely by association. This analysis is
important as it helps to reveal the argumentative shortcomings that prevented any kind of
reasonable consensus to be made between these two groups in American society. When two
interpretations of an event are not only far from reality but also far from the sources themselves,
the result is embitterment and mutual polarization. Mutual hostility and misunderstanding
become entrenched, creating an ideological status quo.
Finally, it appears that Catholics got the last word in on this debate in the Times as the
single reply of Mgr. Michael Ready and then a massive show of force of 175 Catholic
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intellectuals followed the signed Protestant letter. These intellectuals came from a broad stock of
professions: deans, university presidents, editors, professors, and Catholic organization
presidents from all over the country, with most being members of the clergy. The role of clergy
and the intelligentsia with respect to both Catholic and liberal/Protestant groups in this debate
reveals that the American intelligentsia believed themselves to have a stake in such a foreign
conflict in a period of isolationism and diplomatic retreat. Furthermore, the elevated role of the
clergy specifically reinforces the notion that clergy had been and continued to be the leading
figures in the Catholic intelligentsia. These replies are in the Oct. 6 and 14 issues respectively.
Ready immediately characterized the Protestant representations of the bishops’ arguments as
“…a strawman, hideous and offensive” and also questioned the motivations of the Protestant
signers, emphasizing their distance from the conflict.56 Catholic clergy and intellectuals certainly
had a vested interest in international Church affairs but what about Protestants? Based on a
history of anti-Catholicism, it seems that there was mutual misunderstanding of each other’s
motives. Again, the replies targeted the opposing side’s seemingly inadequate portrayal of the
Popular Front government, once again emphasizing a theme of communist corruption that
destabilized and delegitimized the Republic:
Does American Protestantism endorse a regime that is composed predominantly of
radical Socialists, Communists, Syndicalists and Anarchists? Does American
Protestantism champion a regime that has consistently violated in theory and in practice
the fundamental principles of liberty and democracy guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States?57
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American Protestants saw Spain as an existential battle against fascism, an ideology
incompatible with democratic values while American Catholics simply flipped fascism for
communism. With both being completely entrenched in their own perspectives against
alternative facts or viewpoints, there thus existed an ideological no man’s land in which a middle
ground was impossible to survive in. Seeing how each side tied their rhetoric to American
fundamentals as a means of viewpoint justification reflects the larger debate about American
identity that both sides took part in, whether they realized it then or not.
Like other Catholic publications, Catholic Worker (CW) published a statement in
October blasting the hawkishness of American liberals and questioned not only their sincerity in
responding to the letter but also the sincerity of the Times for publishing the letter around the
same time as Roosevelt’s “quarantine” speech and a Congressional appropriations bill for
military spending to the tune of “over half a billion dollars.”58 To the editors of CW, the rhetoric
of “defending Democracy” or “fighting Fascism” served as a pretext for justifying American
intervention in a conflict it had no business in. Essentially, the whole episode reeked of
deliberate conspiracy to justify worldwide intervention and war profiteering. CW argued that the
response of American Protestants and liberals to the Spanish Bishops was not so much a
debunking of the bishops’ argument as it was rather a directed attack towards the American
Catholic intelligentsia, a message that their rhetoric was not going to be welcome in the
mainstream forum. This episode of defending the common Catholic position was unique for
Catholic Worker at this time because of their usually neutralist stance on the issue. In the case of
the Bishops’ Letter, it seems there was enough insincerity and outright dangerous rhetoric
coming from American liberals to prompt a reaction from this otherwise neutralist publication.
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Catholic Worker: In the Eye of The Storm
While there was a near constant back and forth of rhetorical warfare between American
liberals/Protestants and Catholics, one group of Catholics felt like they belonged to neither
opposing pole of this rhetorical spectrum. More specifically, there was a group relegated to the
sidelines of the discussion who saw all war as an evil product of our flawed human condition and
who believed neither side of the civil war could be directly supported or encouraged by
Americans in good conscience. They vehemently dissented from the notion that any good
Catholic had to support Franco’s cause in the war or else be a godless communist who would let
Western Civilization crumble. This group was the Catholic Worker movement, led by former
communist Dorothy Day. Their paper, The Catholic Worker, served as a on-going manifesto for
their pacifist, pro-labor, anti-capitalist, and dual anticommunist/antifascist program. Unlike the
other papers looked at so far, Catholic Worker was very new, having been established in 1933,
only three years prior to the breakout of the civil war. The other papers, while not themselves
being the oldest continual presses in America, still had deeper roots at the time of this analysis.
Because of the heavily skewed ideological landscape of Catholic publications during this
time period, Catholic Worker provides a unique contrast to the rest of the American Catholic
scene with regards to the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s Nationalist movement. Because of this,
Catholic Worker was of enough interest as to be one of the primary focuses of Valaik’s article
regarding American Catholic dissent from the majority pro-Franco opinion.59 This is not to
suggest that Catholic Worker was the only significant American Catholic voice dissenting from
the majority pro-Franco opinion; only that as a regularly published newspaper it provides the
best example of collective dissent for the purposes of this thesis. Without a concrete example of
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evidence such as this, the ideological landscape of American Catholics appears very unilateral in
documentary evidence. A lack of alternative opinions such as those from CW leaves an
incomplete picture of the ideological landscape of Catholic America.
From its first publication addressing the civil war in December of 1936, Catholic Worker
makes its position noticeably clear with the title “Spanish Catholic Flays Both Sides!” and
subtitle “Claims Double-Refusal of Communism and Fascism Is Duty of Christians; Rebels Did
Not Exhaust Peaceful Means; Both Sides Have Fought Like Savages.”60 With just the first words
of the paper, the editors of Catholic Worker made it clear to their audience that their position on
Spain was going to be different from the American Catholic norm. Crucially, the editors of
Catholic Worker chose to let a Spaniard speak on the subject. In their note prefacing the letter,
they stated:
[The Spaniard’s letter] expresses the stand of The Catholic Worker and for that reason we
are re-printing it entirely. We are using the front page for this purpose because the civil
war in Spain and the stand the Catholics and Communists in other countries are taking is
a vital issue today.61
This statement importantly demonstrates a degree of humility— an unwillingness to morally
grandstand and an unwillingness to play into a toxic cycle of anger and editorial reaction. The
original author goes on to lambast the hypocrisies of both the left and right while simultaneously
denouncing the total nature of the conflict, specifically emphasizing the eternally corrupting
nature of warfare:
What are we to think of so-called Catholics who believe themselves free from its
observance [Catholic doctrine on war] because their own particular conception of
patriotism is at stake? […] The holiest end will never suffice to justify a criminal action
for all politics must serve Morals. Now war, and from the strongest reason, civil war is
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avowed to be the most wholly immoral of all means. It is the sum of all the vices and all
the passions.62
Continuing further, the author emphasized the effects of civil warfare on otherwise
peaceful citizenry of Spain itself: “But the militarism of civilians is more formidable still than
that of the military […] The citizen degenerated into a soldier becomes proud of his trade
because he feels the sense of power and is above the law.”63 Essentially, total war had blinded
Catholics to the underlying moral realities of the situation and given them a false sense of
righteousness in a perceived crusade. However, what really sells this letter as a shining example
of Catholic Worker’s position on Spain is the following quote originally bolded in the paper
towards the end of the Spaniard’s remarks:
But justice compels us to a severity in judgment, all the greater if we perceive a like
hatred among those who claim for themselves the name of Catholics. For we owe to the
Truth of Christ, to the Love that Christ had for all men, the homage of the conquest of
souls, not the insult of the massacre or bodies in a hatred which prevents the conversion
of souls.64
Thus, to Catholic Worker, a true Catholic position demanded non-alliance with either faction. It
demanded a sacrifice akin to the Christian principle of love thy enemy.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this staunchly dissident attitude towards the conflict did not pass
without receiving attention from those who deemed it unfit. In the February 1937 edition of
Catholic Worker, a letter from Chicago attorney Paul Cocot criticized the paper’s position,
equating the letter’s pacifism with letting a mad man run through the streets waving a gun or
letting a rabies infected dog run about a crowd. Curiously, Cocot also equated denying the
Nationalists’ right to revolt against “tyranny” to denying the legitimacy of America’s
revolutionary patriots. Regarding the hypothetical rabies-infected dog, he asked bluntly “[D]o we
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pet him or do we shoot him down as quickly as possible?”65 He then asked the editors of CW if
they would hold the same position if it were their own “mother, daughter, sister, or brother” that
were being killed by the government’s “rabble army.”66 The editorial staff of CW chose Stephen
Johnson, the original translator of the Spanish letter to respond to this protest.
Rather than explicitly defending the arguments of the letter paragraph by paragraph,
Johnson focused on questioning the motivations of Catholic intellectuals like Cocot who
implicitly or explicitly accused Catholic Worker of being communist-inclined and thus nonCatholic.67 He turned the accusations around and lambasted the role of privileged and moneyed
American Catholics in standing against necessary social reform and change. He implored the
privileged Catholics to heed the warnings of Pius XI to respect the inherent dignity of the
working person and to respect the work of Catholic Worker lest the Communists have their way
with them.68 Communists were winning because they were filling a vacuum that no one else was
willing to fill. Catholics who failed to understand this were only doing more damage to their
cause by enabling the success of Communism among the working class.
In the June issue later that year, Catholic Worker further elucidated its philosophy on
warfare by quoting from one of their talks to an audience from St. Louis group:
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War, in theory, can be justified but modern war as an actuality can hardly be defended on
any grounds. […] Unfortunately many Catholics are seduced into this [Rightist] camp
and conceive of the struggle against the errors of Communism as a war of extermination
against those who appear to be followers of Marx. Needless to say, this is not the
Christian conception of the eternal struggle between truth and error.69
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While in many ways the position of Catholic Worker was distinct enough from the
mainstream Catholic opinion as to make it unique for its pacifist and neutralist stance, in other
ways it was not so different. As seen in the response to the rhetorical conflict regarding the
Bishops’ Letter, Catholic Worker made their position clear that, despite endorsing neither the
Franco movement nor the unapologetic pro-Franco rhetoric from other Catholics, they would not
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accept the utterly dishonest and disingenuous treatment of the Spanish issue by the mainstream
American press. However, as the Spanish conflict drew closer to a close, it came time to reflect
on the experiences of the war. As the Second World War loomed closer and closer to the United
States, attitudes towards Spain shifted accordingly. This next section will seek to address this
shift.
1939 and Beyond: Reflection and Looking Forward
By the end of 1938, the situation in Spain decidedly favored Franco’s Nationalist forces.
A fierce Catalonia campaign started late December, and Barcelona, one of the last holdouts of
Republican forces and the then seat of the Republican government, fell to Nationalist forces on
January 23rd. Madrid soon followed and by the start of April, a communique from Franco stated
simply “The war is over.”70 The existential communist threat to Western Civilization and the
Church had been quashed with the final flight of Republican forces and officials, but the cost had
been great. Payne writes:
The civil war was the most destructive experience in modern Spanish history, rivaled
only by the French invasion of 1808. It resulted in great loss of life, much human
suffering, disruption of the society and the economy, distortion and repression in cultural
affairs, and truncation of the country’s political development.71
In light of the conclusion to this devastating conflict, how did Americans, who had been
up until this point seriously invested in the conflict, react to the imminent reality of Franco’s
triumph? Even into January, when the war was close to being decided, some sectors of the liberal
intelligentsia were still questioning and debating the issue of the United States’ neutrality.
Catholic intellectuals responded ferociously, appearing to take this discussion as a continued
insult considering the skewed nature of the conflict at the time and more importantly, because
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breaking neutrality would be a violation of what appeared to be a genuinely American
consensus. Not only was it never the business of Americans to involve themselves in any
overseas conflict, as Catholic Worker argued explicitly, but also because intervention would
always be the worst option to as it would prolong an already devastating war. As an example of
this rhetoric, Joseph Thorning argued
before a crowd of 2000 Catholics for
neutrality that communist groups were
responsible for agitating against the
Spanish embargo in favor of the
remaining Loyalist forces.
Furthermore, regarding American
liberal calls to support the Loyalists at
this time, he emphatically stated

Figure 7- American isolationism is a unique phenomenon to study in
this time period because of the intersection of various, distinctly
different political groups and ideologies, although each usually had
their own reasons. From Bryan, Dan, “The Power of the Isolationists
Before World War II,” American History USA, February 9, 2015.

These murderers are now put forth by certain groups in this country as worthy of some
special favor for treatment under our national neutrality legislation. Never a greater hoax
or fraud was attempted than to call upon Catholics to protest against the persecution of
Christians in Central Europe, and in the same breath to urge them to help put arms and
planes in the hands of those who have been murdering the priests and laity of the
church.72
This argument is yet another reflection of the common Catholic critique of the liberal position.
Two days later, in an editorial directed to the Times, Thorning again lambasted the hypocrisy of
American liberals in their attempt to rouse support for the Loyalist cause. He stated, “The sad
fact is revealed that the majority of those who were most vociferous in condemning religious
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persecution in Central Europe are eager to convince themselves and others that Catholic
suffering is either fictitious, ‘exaggerated,’ or a ‘transitory phase.’”73
Another argument lambasting American hypocrisy appears in America. In her article,
Brooke Stewart argued that the same Americans crying out in support of Republicans and
Spanish Democracy were the same Americans who previously called Spain an uncivilized,
backwater nation incapable of enlightened thought: “Can those who called Spain an
unprogressive country of dim-witted peasantry believe that those ignorant, amoral, Churchbound serfs became, of a sudden, types of courage and intelligence? Probably not.”74 She
concluded by arguing that American liberal disdain for Franco, an extension of prejudice against
conservative Spanish institutions, was also a direct extension of existing anti-Catholic bias
within America. Anti-Francoism was then essentially a form of contrarianism. Whatever
Catholics supported or believed, liberals and Protestants should then support or believe the
opposite.
The Catholic position now was not so much as to justify the Franco regime directly but
rather indirectly justify the anti-intervention position to American liberals through the rhetoric of
maintaining American neutrality, a position that a large swath of the populace still supported
under the larger umbrella of isolationism. Catholic thought at this stage of the conflict was not so
much a reflection on what had occurred during the war but rather a pragmatic looking forward in
light of the chaos that the whole world was about to be caught up in. This thought process
seemed to be a counter to the sort of liberal rhetoric that Franco’s success meant another
deathblow to western democracy. While many Catholics were still rightly concerned with the
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rise of fascism in Europe as it pertained to world peace, the higher concern was still devoted to
the potential threat of communism.
To Catholics, an existential threat in the form of communism had been eradicated and,
despite the human tolls that this victory demanded, it was time to look forward now that the
crisis was over. Any other considerations regarding Spain at this point were mere afterthoughts.
Regardless, there were still Catholics (CW being an obvious example) who were concerned at
the potential fascist and Nazi trajectory of Spain. As the United States got involved in the world
war, these concerns began to amplify. The simple reality however was that the violence had not
ceased with the formal end of the conflict. As Franco’s dictatorship matured and developed,
repressions against former Republicans and political dissidents would increase and be
codified/legitimized in the Law of Political Responsibilities. 75
Relating to the subject of repression, Thorning drew the ire of American liberals in the
Times when he questioned the motivations of a signed Protestant plea to the Pope on behalf of
the defeated Republicans. Liberals lambasted what seemed to be a simple excuse for
totalitarianism while also calling Thorning’s comments tone deaf and uncharitable. In a reply to
his comments, Ed Torpe wrote to the Times:
Franco is an avowed Catholic whose noble Christian character has only recently been
extolled in the congratulatory message addressed to him by the Pope. But is not mercy
one of the cardinal tenets of the church? If Franco follows not Christ, but Stalin, in
exterminating his enemies, where is the difference between the Catholic Church and the
Comintern? 76
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Figure 8- Francisco Franco saluting his army of nearly a quarter million troops at a victory parade following the surrender of
Madrid, May 20, 1939. From Nelsson, Richard. 2019. "The End Of The Spanish Civil War - Archive, 1939". The Guardian.

Of course, comparing the institution of the Church to the Comintern is disingenuous, but Ed
Torpe’s point elucidates some of the contradictory elements of American Catholic thought
regarding the Spanish Civil War. Thorning responded the next day, arguing that the assumption
that the regime would engage in a “series of one-sided trials and wholesale executions” was a
“gratuitous hypothesis.” Furthermore, he argued that the hypothesis was made in bad faith given
that the wholesale execution of the clergy and laity during the outbreak of the war had largely
been ignored by the liberal/Protestant intelligentsia and greatly outweighed Nationalist
excesses.77
This brief episode of debate in the Times represents another example of how American
Catholics used the press to voice their beliefs to the rest of the country. Much like the case of the
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Bishops’ Letter in 1937, the end of the war presented another opportunity for Protestants/liberals
and Catholics to debate the fundamental issues of the war and how it related to religion,
democracy, and ideology in the United States. However, after this point, the debates of the
Spanish Civil War began to disappear in light of the rapid explosion of world tensions
culminating in the Second World War. Instead, there was now the concern that the now
victorious Nationalists would seek an alliance with the Axis powers.
While the fears of Franco moving closer to the Axis were still fresh in the minds of many
Americans, there was a sense of pragmatism and optimism not exclusive to Catholic circles. In
the Times later that year, an article from an unidentified author stated “Franco’s more immediate
problems are still internal. He has taken over a nation in ruins. The task of reconstruction will
prove tremendous. It is a task that is likely to keep him thinking of home affairs rather than […]
foreign gestures or adventures.”78 The argument thus followed that if Franco had to rebuild a
destroyed country, he had no real motivation or resources to assist the Axis powers in their
schemes for world domination.
It was only during the middle of America’s direct involvement in WW2 that the Spanish
question became an issue as the Axis attempted to woo Franco towards them once again. In an
America article from September 1942, nearly a year after the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, the
journal argued that “liberalistic saboteurs” were attempting to wreck the peace between the U.S.
and Spain because of their ideology and disdain for Franco. This article argued that, along with
the internal restructuring of the Franco regime, the diplomatic work of the United States and
Great Britain was successful in keeping Nazi influence out of Spain. Anybody that said
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otherwise in the United States was merely sabotaging the operation and could potentially drive
Spain back into the Nazi camp.79
The following year, another America article warned of a liberal plot to agitate the
American people through the mainstream media against Spain even when there existed a
peaceful status quo. Again, tying back into the rhetoric of liberal anti-Catholic bias, the journal
stated:
The chief selling point of this propaganda is the notion that a new Axis is being created,
with the Vatican, Spain and Portugal as the turning points. Hitler bids fair to become the
forgotten man; and once more the Pope looms up as the real arch-enemy, just as the KuKlux Klan has known all along.80
Once again, liberal rhetoric against Franco was not so much used to fight fascism but as a way to
discriminate against Catholics. To further emphasize this point, America argued that by ignoring
the plight of Basque Catholics suffering under Francoist repressions, American liberals were
only further revealing their hypocrisy and anti-Catholic schemes:
In Time or Life, no photographs appear of the Catholic priests and Religious imprisoned
in Carmona jail. They would not serve the purpose of using the Spanish issue as a lever
with which to renew old passions of political or ideological propaganda.81
Although not taking rhetoric in the same direction as America regarding Franco’s neutrality,
Margarita de Planelles argued in Catholic World that the social, economic, and political
circumstances of Spain made breaking neutrality akin to suicide. Franco’s policy had foresight
after witnessing continued “reverses sustained by the Axis powers in Russia, Egypt, and
Tunisia.”82 Therefore, liberal rhetoric stating that Franco was going to join the Axis and attack
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the Allies along the exposed Moroccan front or at Gibraltar was unfounded. Instead, it was
liberal agitation and provocation against Spain that could actually upset the peace and status quo.
Thus, although there were new practical insights among the Catholic intelligentsia
regarding the excesses of Franco’s regime in the post-civil war stage and there was a heightened
concern about the influence of Naziism and other Axis influences in Spain, Catholic attitudes
towards Spain and the liberal/Protestant position were largely unchanged by the late hours of the
Second World War. Rather than reevaluate the arguments and debates from an impartial view
and assess the reactionary nature of both sides in debates over Spain, most Catholics reaffirmed
that Franco was the better force for peace and order in Spain and that Protestants and liberals
would deliberately sabotage the United State’s relationship with Franco’s Spain in order to
pursue their long existing communist, anti-Catholic agenda.
From these conclusions we are again brought back to the phenomena described by
George Shuster, “minorityitis.” Catholics, still feeling that their political, social, and cultural
opinions were being opposed by the anti-Catholic majority purely because of their religious
beliefs, lashed out against the rest of America to not only defend their own beliefs but also to
counter what they saw as deliberate provocation. The collective experiences of the 19th century,
the Klan, the treatment of Russia and Mexico, the election cycles of the 20s, and now Spain were
all formative experiences that engendered a bitter and defensive attitude. Although there were
still many Catholics like Shuster and the writers of Catholic Worker who were able to see past
the glamorous crusader-like image of the Nationalists, most just accepted Franco’s defense of the
Catholic Church without any qualifications or reservations since it was opposite of the majority
liberal/Protestant defense of the Loyalists or Republicans.
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The truth of course is that both sides of the Spanish debate often failed to see their own
argumentative faults. Modern war is especially troublesome to moralize and even more so with
social, political, economic, and religious tensions as high as the Spanish Civil War. This thesis
does not attempt to directly evaluate the arguments of American Catholics and liberals one
against the other, but rather, demonstrate that both were increasingly motivated by ideology and
emotions rather than rationality and pragmatism. Indeed, it was just as much a fight over Spain
as it was over ideas central to all Americans: religion, culture, citizenship, and democratic ideals.
However, the United States’ origins as a Protestant, Enlightened nation presented a powerful
barrier to Catholic religion, culture, and political ideas. What Spain shows us in this thesis is that
this larger fight was still ongoing in America as Catholics fought for recognition as a serious
body of intellectually fruitful and useful citizens.
As anti-Catholicism began to wane in the second half of the 20th century, Catholics were
definitively integrated into the American system though their religion still may have been foreign
to the original stock of the nation. However, the shape of the Church today in a more modern
post-Vatican II world is quite different than the Church of the 30s and 40s. Though they were
separated by region and ethnic origins, American Catholics were almost universally united in
ideology and cultural practices during the period of this thesis. Today, as the cultural, racial, and
religious diversity of this country continues to increase alongside irreligiousness and loosened
morality, the position of Catholics now is likely not so much to fight against a unipolar antiCatholic establishment but rather, fight to win the hearts and minds of a vastly larger pool of
various ideas, cultures, and political orientations. Thus, it remains to be seen how American
Catholicism will look in the future with not only so much external divisions in the country but
also new internal divisions along theological, political, cultural, and racial lines.
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